Non Linear Effects of Leaks on Unjust Systems of Governance

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  • Article: Julian Assange: The non linear effects of leaks on unjust systems of governance. Sun 31 Dec 2006

URL = http://web.archive.org/web/20071020051936/http://iq.org/ [1]

Contents

Text

"You may want to read The Road to Hanoi or Conspiracy as Governance [second essay following]; an obscure motivational document, almost useless in light of its decontextualization and perhaps even then. But if you read this latter document while thinking about how different structures of power are differentially affected by leaks (the defection of the inner to the outer) its motivations may become clearer.

The more secretive or unjust an organization is, the more leaks induce fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning coterie. This must result in minimization of efficient internal communications mechanisms (an increase in cognitive "secrecy tax") and consequent system-wide cognitive decline resulting in decreased ability to hold onto power as the environment demands adaption.

Hence in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust systems are nonlinearly hit relative to open, just systems. Since unjust systems, by their nature induce opponents, and in many places barely have the upper hand, mass leaking leaves them exquisitely vulnerable to those who seek to replace them with more open forms of governance.

Only revealed injustice can be answered; for man to do anything intelligent he has to know what's actually going on.


Source

"These essays on conspiracies by Julian Assange (me@iq.org) were retrieved today from his website iq.org.

The first from the currently active site, dated Novermber 10, 2006, i.e. http://iq.org/conspiracies.pdf

and the second at archive.org, dated December 3, 2006, at http://web.archive.org/web/20070110200827/http://iq.org/conspiracies.pdf


Discussion

Author?

"Thanks to Jason Lewis for pointing to this in his Mail On Sunday report.


"You may want to read The Road to Hanoi or Conspiracy as Governance [second essay following]; an obscure motivational document, almost useless in light of its decontextualization and perhaps even then. But if you read this latter document while thinking about how different structures of power are differentially affected by leaks (the defection of the inner to the outer) its motivations may become clearer.

The more secretive or unjust an organization is, the more leaks induce fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning coterie. This must result in minimization of efficient internal communications mechanisms (an increase in cognitive "secrecy tax") and consequent system-wide cognitive decline resulting in decreased ability to hold onto power as the environment demands adaption. Hence in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust systems are nonlinearly hit relative to open, just systems. Since unjust systems, by their nature induce opponents, and in many places barely have the upper hand, mass leaking leaves them exquisitely vulnerable to those who seek to replace them with more open forms of governance.

Only revealed injustice can be answered!

(http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf)

More Information

  1. Julian Assange, State and Terrorist Conspiracies, 11/2006, http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf
  2. Julian Assange, Conspiracy as Governance, 12/2006, http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf