Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies

Article: The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies, by Rob Carlson

URL = http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0614.html?

Background

This is a key essay to understand the evolution towards distributed manufacturing of biological materials.

Originally published in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science Volume 1 Number 3, August 2003. Published on KurzweilAI.net March 4, 2004.

Abstract

The parts for a DNA synthesizer can now be purchased for approximately $10,000. By 2010 a single person will be able to sequence or synthesize 10^10 bases a day. Within a decade a single person could sequence or synthesize all the DNA describing all the people on the planet many times over in an eight-hour day or sequence his or her own DNA within seconds. Given the power and threat of biological technologies, the only way to ensure safety in the long run is to push research and development as fast as possible. Open and distributed networks of researchers would provide an intelligence gathering capability and a flexible and robust workforce for developing technology.

Excerpt

From the intro:

"THE ADVENT OF THE home molecular biology laboratory is not far off. While there is no Star Trek "Tricorder" in sight, the physical infrastructure of molecular biology is becoming more sophisticated and less expensive every day. Automated commercial instrumentation handles an increasing fraction of laboratory tasks that were once the sole province of doctoral level researchers, reducing labor costs and increasing productivity. This technology is gradually moving into the broader marketplace as laboratories upgrade to new equipment. Older, still very powerful instruments are finding their way into wide distribution, as any cursory tour of eBay will reveal.1 These factors are contributing to a proliferation that will soon put highly capable tools in the hands of both professionals and amateurs worldwide. There are obvious short term risks from increased access to DNA synthesis and sequencing technologies, and the general improvement of technologies used in measuring and manipulating molecules will soon enable a broad and distributed enhancement in the ability to alter biological systems. The resulting potential for mischief or mistake causes understandable concern—there are already public calls by scientists and politicians alike to restrict access to certain technologies, to regulate the direction of biological research, and to censor publication of some new techniques and data. It is questionable, however, whether such efforts will increase security or benefit the public good. Proscription of information and artifacts generally leads directly to a black market that is difficult to monitor and therefore difficult to police. A superior alternative is the deliberate creation of an open and expansive research community, which may be better able to respond to crises and better able to keep track of research whether in the university or in the garage." (http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0614.html?)

THE PROLIFERATION OF SKILLS AND MATERIALS IS INEVITABLE

"Beyond information about writing DNA from scratch, extensive instructions on standard chemistry and molecular biology techniques are available on the Web, notably detailed descriptions of PCR (polymerase chain reaction) and other important DNA manipulation procedures. While some skills are still highly specialized, basic know-how is permeating the educational process.14 For several years community colleges have offered courses of study aimed at providing the biotech industry with skilled technicians. A case in point: when it was founded in 1990, the sequencing facility at the Whitehead Institute Center for Genome Research employed primarily scientists with doctorates. Over the years these PhD's were gradually replaced by masters degrees, then bachelors and associates degrees. Now many of the staff have completed only a six month qualification course at local community college or are recent Tibetan immigrants who received training in basic skills at the Institute.15 These technicians are educated in all the steps necessary to shepherd DNA from incoming sample to outgoing sequence information, including generating bacteria containing DNA from other organisms. This point bears repeating: Creating genetically modified organisms is now the province of immigrants with little formal education. More sophisticated practical knowledge is available to many AP Biology students in high school. Pointing the way into the future, several universities now teach a Molecular Biology for Engineers class. Exploring the limits of this trend is a class taught at MIT wherein students ranging from undergraduates to post-docs design and test new genetic circuits.16 Successful designs will be included in a databook of biological parts.17

Where design expertise exceeds practical experience, commercially available kits include recipes that allow moving genes between organisms by following simple recipes. The process might be slightly more complicated than baking cookies, but it is for the most part less complicated than making wine or beer. This broad distribution of biological technology naturally leads to questions of how it will be applied. Our society is just beginning discussions about the role of genetic modifications and the applications of cellular cloning.

More important, perhaps, is the debate over regulation of research and who will be permitted access to which biological technologies. But it is unlikely that regulation of materiel or skills will produce an increase in public safety. The industrial demand alone for skilled biotechnology workers has increased 14–17% per year for the last decade, and many of these workers come from overseas.18 Not all these workers will remain in this country, and it is safe to say many of those who leave will make use of their skills elsewhere. If we decide to try to limit the practice of certain methods, it will be unrealistic to try to centrally monitor every skilled person in this or any other country. We certainly cannot simply "unteach" the relevant skills to prevent unauthorized use, and any action to limit the proliferation of skills would cripple that portion of the U.S. economy reliant upon biological technologies.

Perhaps more problematic than distributed skills will be ubiquitous materials. The widespread distillation of alcohol during the Prohibition period in the U.S. and the proliferation of modern illegal drug synthesis labs both illustrate the principle that outlawing chemical products merely leads to black markets more difficult to observe and regulate than open markets.

Effective regulation relies on effective enforcement, which in turn requires effective detection. The extent of illegal drug production in the United States and previous failures to detect illicit biological weapons production gives some indication of the relevant challenges of detection and enforcement. Approximately 8,000 clandestine drug laboratories were seized in the U.S. in 2001, with the vast majority of those being "Mom and Pop" operations producing less than five kilograms per day.19 Yet despite the large number of seizures (which has on average remained constant for the last decade) illegal drug use is apparently still rising.20 This failure of enforcement, and the detection failure demonstrated when Western intelligence services failed to uncover the existence of extensive bioweapons programs in the former Soviet Union and Iraq,21 provide explicit challenges to the notion that the risks posed by mistakes or mischief resulting from biological technologies can be mitigated through regulation.

Given the potential power of biological technologies, it is worth considering whether open markets are more, or less, desirable than the inevitable black markets that would emerge with regulation. Those black markets would be, by definition, beyond regulation. More importantly, in this case, they would be opaque.

The real threat from distributed biological technologies lies neither in their development nor use, per se, but rather that biological systems may be the subject of accidental or intentional modification without the knowledge of those who might be harmed. Because this may include significant human, animal, or plant populations, it behooves us to maximize our knowledge about what sort of experimentation is taking place around the world. Unfortunately (though understandably), the first response to incidents such as the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001 is to attempt to improve public safety through means that paradoxically often limit our capabilities to gather such information." (http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0614.html?)