Primordialist vs Critical Approaches to Civilizations
Discussion
Gregorio Bettiza and Fabio Petito:
"Primordialists have presented civilizations as concrete, macro-cultural entities with long, continuous and distinct histories and boundaries, which profoundly structure the way societies, economies, polities and states within them function in the international system. Primordialists’ views of civilizations are most clearly articulated in the writings of ‘clash of civilizations’ theorists, like Huntington, Lewis or Dugin. It is also recognizable to a lesser extent in the writings on the dialogue of civilizations. Especially when it emphasizes the overwhelming centrality of the religious dimension and the view that mutually exclusive and internally monolithic – but not irremediably antagonistic and irreconcilable – religiously-shaped civilizations exist in the world
By taking Huntington as our main Primordialist voice, how would this perspective explain the rise of civilizational politics in international relations today? For Primordialists the turn towards civilizational imaginaries and narratives in the post-Cold War is explained along two lines. The first is a sort of ‘ancient hatreds/Cold War freeze’ argument. Civilizations were always there and have always mattered, but we were blinded to this reality by the power of secular ideologies – communism, nationalism, fascism, and liberalism – throughout much of the twentieth century. The century of secular ideologies had temporarily frozen the forces profondes of world history. The end of communism and fascism on the one hand, and the crisis of nationalism and liberalism on the other, have opened our eyes to what are our real and truest identities and our most profound traditions and beliefs, those rooted in civilizational belonging and culture (Huntington 1996, 21–28). The second argument is what can be labeled as the ‘interaction/friction’ argument. The processes of globalization which has taken over the world in the post-Cold War era, has made the world a ‘smaller place’ (Huntington 1993, 25), causing cultures to rub shoulders ever more closely. Increased interactions, and decreased space for autonomy and maneuver, has ended up intensifying our awareness that, rather than being all alike in a global village, we are actually all different across multiple civilizations and share commonalities within the same one.
There are important problems with this ‘back to the future’ scenario Primordialists present. Both arguments laid out above point towards some kind of change happening in the post-Cold War, but under-theorize why this change is conducive to bringing to the fore civilizational imaginaries and narratives beyond stating that civilizations have always been there. Have they, though? Where do we see them? We are certainly not aided by the fact that, as Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2007, 47) pithily puts it, civilizations have ‘no front office or central bureaucracy’ we can easily turn to or point at. Huntington’s definition of civilizations does not help us either since it is one that emphasizes, paradoxically in terms of his own Primordialist perspective, the subjective rather than objective nature of civilizations. Huntington (1993, 24) tells us that civilizations are the ‘highest cultural grouping’, the largest ‘we’, that people can use to distinguish one another short of what ‘distinguishes humans from other species’. The question then is why do humans need to identify themselves with this particular grouping, after the end of the Cold War? Why aren’t, instead, the even larger ‘we’ of humanity or much narrower local identities drowning out civilizational ones? Why do increased interactions thanks to globalization necessarily accentuate what is different amongst us, rather than what is similar?
While Huntington does gesture to a view of civilizations as constituted by subjective and intersubjective beliefs which evolve over time, he under-theorizes why and how these subjectivities have changed with the end of the Cold War in ways that bring forth the civilizational politics we are witnessing today. In other words, Huntington’s cultural reductionism generates what the most recent sociological scholarship on civilizational analysis calls an ‘identitarian bias’ (Arnason 2003, 4–5), that is an exaggeration of closure and internal unity. As a consequence, a presumed cultural core of civilizations becomes the overwhelming determinant, almost the independent variable, to explain important social, economic and political developments locally and globally. Huntington does not really need to explain the post-Cold War ‘return’ of civilizational politics, exactly because it is conceived of as a return to a centuries-long ‘primordial normality’ that had been interrupted by the ‘exceptional abnormality’ of the short twentieth century of secular ideologies.
The issue here is not to reject a priori an explanatory role for the cultural specificity of civilizations, but to understand the working of cultural patterns in a less deterministic way, avoiding what sometimes are tautological forms of reasoning. For example, take the issue of democracy and its cultural prerequisite: the question should not be about the compatibility or incompatibility of the cultural core of a particular civilization with democracy, a very common framing of the question in recent years in the case of the Islamic civilization. Rather, the question should be framed on the basis of two assumptions. First, the internal differentiation of civilizations some theorists do by talking of civilizational contexts, configurations, constellations, patterns or complexes to indicate a civilization’s internal complexity and dynamism (Katzenstein 2010b, 5). Second, the recognition that civilizational contexts can indeed ‘set the limits to internal cultural diversity or ideological pluralism’ (Arnason 2003, 5). Civilizational contexts generate constraints on the behavior of all actors that operate within this particular cultural frame of reference. But these systemic factors circumscribe a set of possibilities rather than determine specific outputs. In order to explain a particular output – for example the prospects of democracy in a specific Muslim-majority country – a civilizational cultural analysis must be supplemented by an elite-centered analysis of power that makes sense of the struggles (ideological, economic and political) internal to a civilizational context.
Eisenstadt (2003), for example, has shown the centrality of different patterns of dissent, protest and interactions between orthodox and heterodox traditions in understanding civilizational developments. Coming back to our example, the key focus of analysis should be on the relationship between the different competing interpretations of the Islamic legacy and the competition for power of the different groups, constituencies and sectors of societies involved. As a result, the general question of Islam and democracy could be answered by saying that Islam is what Muslims make of it within the constraint of its civilizational legacy. At the heart of this analysis we find the role of elites as initiators of change and carriers of innovative cultural projects as well as crucial mediators between cultural patterns and power relations (Eisenstadt 2003; also Arnason 2003).
Where Huntington leaves us in the dark, Critical approaches pick up. These, in fact, see no concrete reality to civilizations except their (inter)subjective ideological nature. Civilizations are ideologies, or better discourses of power, and that is why – Critical perspectives argue – they are so appealing and widely used. Notably articulated in the writing of Edward Said (2001; also Said 1978) and others (Adib-Moghaddam 2011; Hall and Jackson 2007), Critical approaches deconstruct civilizational invocations and narratives as the manifestation of age-old colonial discourses that seek to divide the West from the Rest, produce and reify inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries, and legitimize the West’s exercise of power over an ‘othered’ and ‘orientalized’ Rest. Even when civilizations are not represented in clash but in dialogue the effect is just as pernicious (Bilgin 2012, see also Sen 2006). That’s because, Critical perspectives insist, civilizational invocations help constitute a new form of false consciousness which problematically reifies singular and mutually exclusive belongings that either, on the one hand, overlook the multiple, fluid, and often hybrid identities we all hold or, on the other hand, mask what are instead more fundamental identities and objective disparities around gender, class, race, or power.
Compelling as it is, this Critical approach runs into a number of problems when it comes to explaining today’s civilizational politics, however. The first problem, we argue, is that Critical scholars overwhelmingly focus on the role played by civilizational invocations in representing others as enemies. As such, they can hardly explain why dialogue of civilizations narratives – a discourse that ‘others’ others as friends and partners instead of enemies (Bettiza 2014a, 10–11) – have had a remarkable success, becoming institutionalized in multiple instances.
The second problem is the emphasis Critical perspectives put on civilizational narratives and imaginaries as discourses of power and hegemony. Such a view runs into trouble when we consider that civilizational belonging and ideas are often invoked in world politics with an anti- and counter-hegemonic spirit instead (Bettiza 2014b, 9). This is partly, for instance, the intent of both Mohammad Khatami as well as Osama Bin Laden who, from very different standpoints nonetheless present Islam and the Muslim world as under assault by Western military and cultural power and in need of defense. Immanuel Wallerstein has been one of the few radical scholars to recognize this paradox. In order to explain the new traction of civilizational politics, he has argued that ‘the concept of civilizations (plural) arose as a defense against the ravages of civilization (singular)’ (Wallerstein 1991, 224). More specifically, in the context of his world-system analysis, civilizational narratives, borrowed from the history of pre-capitalist ancient empires, are meant as identity-boosting devices for the periphery to challenge the cultural liberal hegemony of the core states of the capitalist world system.
Huntington’s own thesis is similarly a direct critique of modern liberal notions that Western culture and ideas, and thus by extension also its liberal economic and political projects, are universal and ought to be applied globally. As Huntington (1996, 184; see also Huntington 1993, 39–41) bluntly argues: ‘What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest’. Indeed, the late Harvard professor does ultimately call for a retrenchment rather than an expansion of Western power and influence internationally (Huntington 1993, 48–49). Our intent here is not to present Huntington as some closeted post-colonial theorist, which he is not. His broad-brush simplifications and cultural determinism are intellectually pernicious, and his portrayal of Islam as having ‘bloody borders’ (Huntington 1993, 35) oozes prejudice and condescension. The point we are making though, is that civilizational discourses should not be read exclusively as constitutive of hegemonic projects, but also as participating in a politics of contestation and counter-hegemony.
Lastly, Critical perspectives have a further important limit. They cannot explain why such processes of ‘othering’ – either as enemies or friends – have, since the end of the Cold War, taken the civilizational discursive form and substance they have. The problem here, we find, is that Critical approaches often neglect the wider, extra-discursive social and cultural forces, which have made civilizational imaginaries and narratives resonate so widely across the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall, in comparison to other categories in international politics today. In other words, we are faced with a power reductionism that is the asymmetrical opposite, but has similar logics, to the cultural reductionism of the Primordialist approach. Critical approaches view culture as easily instrumentalized to suit power interests without accounting for the autonomous role of cultural innovation within civilizational traditions as crucial in creating the ideological field of competition among different elite-groups and, therefore, in shaping local and global power structures. Therefore, we contend that an answer to the question of ‘why civilizational politics now?’ needs to explore and give concrete form to the interplay between cultural patterns and power structures. It is to this exploration – inevitably initial given the limited space – that we now turn."