Simulationism

Discussion

Johannes Jäger:

"The inevitable superiority of machines is rooted in a metaphysical view of the whole world as a machine. More specifically, it is grounded in an extreme version of a view called computationalism, the idea that not only the human mind, but every physical process that exists in the universe can be considered a form of computation. In other words, what computers do and what we do when we think are exactly the same kind of process. Obviously.

This computational worldview is firghteningly common and fashionable these days. It has become so commonplace that it is rarely questioned anymore, even though it is mere speculation, purely metaphysical, and not based on any empirical evidence.

As an example, an extreme form of computationalism provides the metaphysical foundation for Michael Levin's wildly popular (and equally wildly confused) arguments about agency and (collective) intelligence, which I have criticized before. Here, the computationalist belief is that natural agency is mere algorithmic input-output processing, and intelligence simply lies in the intricacy of this process, which increases every time several computing devices (from rocks to philosophers) join forces to "think" together. It's a weird view of the world that blurs the boundary between the living and the non-living and, ultimately, leads to panpsychism if properly thought through (more on that another time). Panpsychism, by the way, is another view that's increasingly popular with the technorati. Levin gets an honorable mention by Bach and, of course, he's been on Fridman's podcast. It all fits together perfectly. They're all part of the same cult. Computationalism, taken to its logical conclusion, yields the idea that the whole of reality may be one big simulation. This simulation hypothesis (or simulation argument) was popularized by longtermist philosopher Nick Bostrom (another guest on Fridman's podcast).

Not surprisingly, simulation is popular among techies, and has been explicitly endorsed by silicon-valley entrepreneurs like Elon Musk. The argument is based on the idea that computer simulations, as well as augmented and virtual reality, are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from real-world experiences as our technological abilities improve at breakneck speed. We may be nearing a point soon, so the reasoning goes, at which our own simulations will appear as real to us as the actual world. This renders plausible the idea that even our interactions with the actual world may be the result of some gigantic computer simulation.

There are a number of obvious problems with this view. For starters, we may wonder what exactly the point is. Arguably, no particularly useful insights about our lives or the world we live in are gained by assuming we live in a simulation. And it seems pretty hard to come up with an experiment that would reveal the validity of the hypothesis. Yet, the simulation argument does fit rather nicely with the metaphysical assumption that everything in the universe is a computation. If every physical process is simulable, is it not reasonable to assume that these processes themselves are actually the product of some kind of all-encompassing simulation? At first glance, simulation is a perfectly scientific view of the world. But a little bit of reflection reveals a more subtle aspect of the idea, obvious once you see it, but usually kept hidden below the surface: simulation necessarily implies a simulator. If the whole world is a simulation, the simulator cannot be part of it. Thus, there is something (or someone) outside our world doing the simulating. To state it clearly: by definition, the simulator is a supernatural entity, not part of the physical world.

And here we are again: just like Bach's vision of our voluntary subjugation to our digital overlords, the simulation hypothesis is classic transcendental theism — religion through the backdoor. And, again, it is presented in a manner that is attractive to technology-affine people who would never be seen attending a traditional church service, but often feel more comfortable in simulated settings than in the real world. Just don't mention the supernatural simulator lurking in the background too often, and it is all perfectly palatable.

The simulation hypothesis is a powerful tool for deception because it blurs the distinction between actual and virtual reality. If you believe the simulation argument, then both physical and simulated environments are of the same quality and kind — never more than digital computation. And the other way around: if you believe that every physical process is some kind of digital computation to begin with, you are more likely to buy into the claim that simulated experiences can actually be equivalent to real ones. Simple and self-evident! Or so it seems.

The most forceful and focused argument for the equivalence of the real and the virtual is presented in a recent book by philosopher David Chalmers (of philosophical zombie fame), which is aptly entitled "Reality+." It fits the techno-transcendentalist gospel snugly."

(http://www.johannesjaeger.eu/blog/machine-metaphysics-and-the-cult-of-techno-transcendentalism)