Theories on the Origins of the State

Discussion

Leonid Grinin:

"The question about the origin of the state has been highly debated for more than two centuries (for detail see Grinin 2010a, 2011c).

• Production (Wittfogel 1957),
• trade (Webb 1975), and
• military (Сarneiro 1970, 1978, 1981, 1987, 2002, 2003) theories

are sufficiently popular at present.

• Elman R. Service's theory of mutual profit (Service 1975) also has its adherents. Service is of the opinion that, owing to the complication of economic and other functions of power, the rulers and the subjects were increasingly interested in mutual services and, hence, gained profit from strengthening power.

• F. Engels's theory that views the state as a special apparatus of violence to defend the interests of economically dominant classes and suppress exploited classes (Engels 2010 [1884]) is still advocated by many Russian scientists. A number of foreign social scientists also share these ideas (the so-called conflict theory of the origin of the state), although in a significantly modified form. For example, in the opinion of

• Morton H. Fried (1967), the state originated as a result of a long process of social stratification and the elevated struggle for control and resource distribution.

However, all the above theories are open to criticism.

The majority of scholars justly tend toward the idea that a combination of different factors (production needs, conflicts between social strata, wars, and many others) was typically present in this highly complicated process.

• Probably the most reasonable remains Claessen's theory which takes into account several most important factors in their interaction. According to Claessen, to make evolution of early state possible a complex interplay of a number of factors is needed, varying from population growth, the production of a surplus and an ideology which explains and justifies the increasing division of power. Moreover, some incentive seems necessary to trigger the developments (Claessen 2010).3 According to Claessen such triggers include different events (e.g., when vital resources control in hands of certain groups makes them masters of the situation; enlargement of the settlements due to threat of attack), but to our mind, here he underestimates somewhat the role of the military factor.4 Great difficulties with the analysis of the causes of the emergence of the state appear due to the fact that many researchers implicitly tend to the unilinear evolutionary schemes whereas the evolution should be consid- ered as a multilinear one (for detail see Grinin 2011b, 2011c; Grinin, Korotayev 2009c, 2011; Bondarenko, Grinin, Korotayev 2004, 2011). The transition to a new level of complexity is inevitably realized in the bundle of models and forms. They can, on the one hand, be considered within a ‘horizontal’ dimension as equal versions of the same complexity level, and on the other hand, can be analyzed within the evolutionary ‘vertical’ dimension. So theoretically, one may detect ‘main’ and ‘collateral’ development lines of social evolution (see in detail Grinin 2003a, 2004b, 2011b, 2011c). But it took the new organiza- tional principles a rather long time and a few generations of polity types to prove their advantage because possessing an evolutionary potential does not mean to have advantages in a concrete historical situation. Quite often it was just the other way round. Over entire epochs the evolution- ary models coexisted and competed with each other (yet being mutually complementary), whereas in particular ecological and social niches some ‘collateral’ pathways, models, and versions could well have turned out to be more competitive and adequate. We proceed from the assumption that complex chiefdoms, early states, and different other societal types (large confederations, large self-governed civil and temple communities etc.) which will be discussed below, should be considered as standing at the same evolution- ary stage, which could be defined as a complex societies or early-state stage. The transition to it by definition cannot be fulfilled but in a very extensive variety of forms, developmental trends and combinations. The answer to the question about the factors that caused the rise of the state depends on what stages of statehood are singled out. In particular, many authors deny the existence of a specific stage of early (primitive, archaic) states. In our opinion, such formations can be treated as states; we should bear in mind, however, that they could not have all the characteristics of developed forms and partially preserved pre- or non- state institutions. That was why many of them failed to transfer to a higher stage of development. In examining the causes and ways of the rise of the state, political anthropologists often miss the following important point: pre-state polities, when uniting (or annexing other polities), could directly transfer to early state organization. However, pre-state sociopolitical systems often developed,; gave rise to nobility, property inequality, and slavery, but failed to become states because they lacked certain political institutions (strong central power, a professional apparatus of control, etc.). We term such non-state societies, comparable with states with regard to their complexity and functions performed, as early state analogues (for details, see Grinin 2003c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007g, 2007i, 2009h, 2011b, 2011c). Large Gallic polities prior to the conquest of Gaul by Caesar (1st century BC), large nomadic systems (such as the Xiongnu polity in the 2nd century BC or the Scythian ‘kingdom’ up to the late 5th century BC), and complex chiefdoms on the Hawaiian Islands prior to their discovery by J. Cook in the late 18th century can be attributed to such formations. Some of the early state analogues never became states (e.g., Xiongnu), while others turned into sufficiently developed large, rather than small or medium-sized, states (e.g., the Scythians). "

Typology

Leonid Grinin:

"Two main models of transitiong to the state may be justly singled out.

According to the first one, states were forming ‘vertically’, so to speak, i.e., from non-state societies directly to states. For example, in Ancient Greece, people often had to migrate from villages to one large settlement to protect themselves from military actions or pirates; such migrations are called synoecism (Gluskina 1983). Sometimes, large states were formed ‘vertically’ at once, as was the case with the Zulus who rapidly created a sufficiently large state under the rule of ‘Emperor’ Shaka in the south of Africa in the early 19th century from a diversity of small individual chiefdoms (Ritter 1990).

The second way is ‘horizontal’. At first, pre-state societies transfer to a new stage of development (exceptionally in the form of early state analogues) and then transform into states.

However, the inner maturity of society, sufficient surplus production, social stratification, and so on are not enough to form a state. Special circumstances are necessary because transition to the state system is usually associated with sharp changes in social and political life under any model. In our opinion, this transition is facilitated by serious shifts from the habitual situation, such as the cessation of isolation, the emergence of a real threat to society or a part of the population, a sharp rise in trade, internal conflicts, and so on. All this can stimulate substantial changes in management and the political structure (for details, see Grinin 2003c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007g, 2007i, 2009h, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Grinin, Korotayev 2009b, 2009c). In addition, we believe that wars, conquests, borrowing more effective weapons, and the threat of being conquered are, no doubt, of paramount importance among the fac- tors that cause sharp changes in life conditions. For example, importing firearms was an important factor in the formation of certain states, for example, on Madagascar in the 17th century or on the Hawaiian Islands in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (the fact that the islands ceased to be isolated also played an important role here)."

(http://www.sociostudies.org/books/files/macrohistory_and_globalization/083-135.pdf)